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Abstract 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) represent one of the most important avenues for an economic system to improve itself and 
to increase the level of competitiveness within and among its constituent parts – various economic agents. FDI generate a 
variety of effects inside the host-economies (it affects economic growth, regional development, sustainable development, 
etc.), effects that differ from country to country, according to several criteria (economic, political, social, institutional). In 
the same time, the amount of FDI varies from country to country, in accordance to their “attractivity” in the eyes of the 
international business community. There are several factors that influence this perception; this paper will focus on two of 
them – the corruption perception index - CPI (data from Transparency International) and the country risk assessment - CRA 
(data from COFACE). In other words, the present article will analyze the relations between FDI volume, corruption 
perception index and country risk assessments for Central and Eastern Europe in an attempt to answer the question if these 
two factors influence, in any way, FDI in the region. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In order to ensure economic growth and competitiveness in various economic sectors, to be able to create 
new jobs, increase household incomes, promote exports and transfer of advanced knowledge and technology, 
countries mainly need FDI, which is the purpose of integration into the European economic system. 
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An increased emphasis has been placed on assessments by which countries can be ranked for Corruption or 
Country Risk, assessments made by reliable sources like Transparency International, COFACE, Euler Hermes, 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and 
others.  
Literature review: 
There are two types of theories regarding the connections between our three main concepts (FDI, Corruption 
Index and CRA): those that consider that there are important correlations between the three variables and those 
who believe that there are no significant correlations between FDI, CRA and the Corruption Index.  We can 
include in first category researchers like Habib and Zurawicki (2005), Pancras Nagy (1979), Michael McAleer 
(2010), Khalil et al. (2010), Gopinath (2008) and others. 
The second category of theories  consider that there are other factors that influence the FDI flows more than 
corruption, or that there are factors that only added to CRA and corruption can have a real impact on growth 
economies. Exponents of this point of view are Busse et al. (1996) with references on media impact, Kaufmann 
(1997a, 1997b) with studies about Ukraine and Russia, Drabek and Payne (1999), Kotov (2008) that concludes 
in his study that corrupt countries invest more than non-corrupt countries which are reluctant to invest in 
countries like Brazil, Russia, India and China, Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) discovering that in countries with 
transition economies (Former Soviet Bloc) petty corruption was positively related to FDI and others that places 
the emphasis on inefficient Government Institutions, national policies, or property rights. 
The amount of FDI varies from country to country, in accordance to the interest of the international business 
community in investing. Country Risk Assessments (CRA) and Corruption Perception Index can influence the 
decision of investing in a foreign country. 
 
1.1 Foreign Direct Investments 
Foreign direct investment is the name given to the process where a firm / company from one country invests 
capital in a business / company existing or newly created in another country. (BNR Statistics 2012, p.5) 
However, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) calls direct investment 
(FDI) as more than just movement of capital - investment that adds to, deducts from or by which you can have a 
long-term interest and profit in a firm / company operating in the economy, capital - direct investment coming 
from a country other than the firms` / company receiving the investment and “implies that the investor exerts a 
significant influence on the management of the investee company”.(International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
according to Moraru, 2013, p.124) 
Types of FDI 
• Greenfield refers to the establishment of companies - Greenfield investment; 
• Mergers and acquisitions: full or partial takeover of companies by foreign investors; 
• Business development: increasing FDI holdings in companies - foreign direct investment; 
• Firm restructuring: through capital injection (equity) financing losses of direct investment 
enterprises by foreign direct investors. (BNR Statistics 2013, p.6) 
FDI effects: 
A) Direct effects (employment, commercial transactions growth, capital formation); 
B) Indirect effects (transfer of technology and managerial skills to local firms); 
C) Horizontal effects = horizontal spillovers (within the industry) 
• Positive (diffusion of technology within the industry by: - job reallocation - imitation process - 
entry of international firms specialized in related services); 
• Negative: competition or effect of "stealing market" (market / business stealing effect). 
D) Vertical effects = vertical spillovers (between industries - organizing vertical supply chain): 
• Upstream chain: local firms are suppliers of inputs for foreign companies (positive effect due to 
increased demand for inputs for local businesses and could lead to a reduction in average costs); 
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• Downstream chain: foreign companies are suppliers of inputs for local firms (it is also a positive 
effect). 
Benchmark condition for the calculation of FDI (according to Jones &Wren 2012, p.9) 
Foreign Direct Investments = Retained earnings (i.e. direct investors share of earnings/ losses) + Direct 
investors purchase less sales of enterprises `shares + Net increase in long and short term loans, credit and other 
amounts given by the direct investor to overseas enterprise - Overseas enterprise borrowing of money from host 
country or from their own resources in order to give to the direct investor in home country 
Benchmark condition for the calculation of FDI is important in ensuring transparency in comparing 
international direct investment flows / values. 
 
1.2 Country Risk Assessments as a determining factor of internationalization through direct investments 
Country risk is generated by the interaction of political, economic, social and institutional factors, a country-
specific complex reality, national macro-environment that affects any investment or foreign business located in 
that geographical area. Country risk level is also affected by world political and economic situation. 
Country risk is the exposure to loss that may occur in a business with a foreign partner, caused by specific 
events that are at least partially under country governmental control and cannot be controlled by the investment 
decision makers that can only predict such events and avoiding risks by no investing, or opting for a form of 
internationalization adapted to the level of risk in the host country. 
Country Risk Assessments (CRA) significantly influences the overall risk level of FDI as a fundamental 
prediction and evaluation tool in the process of transnational firms’ internationalization through FDI. That is 
why the analysis involves allowing and getting decision makers a correct and complete evaluation of the 
relationship between potential risks and earnings of the business.  
 
1.3 Corruption Index 
The Corruption Index is a Perception Index used to classify countries by their level of abuse of power for 
private gain among Governmental Institutions and the integrity of people in a position of authority. The 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) provides a metric regarding the perceived levels of corruption by country 
and is available for 180 countries. Countries are given a score that ranges from zero to ten, a high score 
meaning low risk of corruption and a lower CPI score indicating high corruption risk. (according to Smith & 
others, 2013, p.15-33) 
Categories of corruption: 
• Systematic corruption (high level Institutionalized corruption as social corruption that modifies 
national Laws, Legislative Norms in favor of specific private firms); 
• Instrumental corruption (“big corruption” that happens and could affect a given social Institution 
and/or  an entire economic sector); 
• Incidental corruption (individual “small corruption” that doesn`t affect the majority of people from 
a country).  
Corruption is not a new phenomenon and recent studies show that it has an impact on the flows of FDI. It 
can facilitate the volume of foreign direct investments by “greasing” the wheels of commerce in the presence of 
weak regulatory framework, or, as in most cases, impede the inflow of FDI because of transaction costs 
uncertainty. 
 
2. Data and Empirical Methodology 
The present article analysis the Foreign Direct Investments inflows in Central and Eastern Europe in 
connection with Country Risk Assessments and Corruption Perception Index. Main data were gathered from 
COFACE, Transparency International, UNCTAD Organizations, data published online, for the period 2008 – 
2014. Based on theoretical and empirical research we want to see if there is a connection between Country Risk 
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Assessments and FDI inflows and also, between Corruption Perception Index and FDI inflows. Tables 
presented below will be compared based on changes reflected through years 2008 – 2013.   
Table 1. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow overview, 2008 - 2013, by region and economy, Central Eastern Europe (Millions of 
Dollars ) 
Foreign Direct Investments Inflow Total 
Region/ 
Economy 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008-2013 
Moldova 711 208 208 288 175 231 1 821 
Slovenia 1 947 -659 360 998 -59 -679 1 908 
Serbia 2 955 1 959 1 329 2 709 365 1 034 10 351 
Croatia 5 938 3 346 490 1 517 1 356 580 13 227 
Slovakia 4 868 -6 1 770 3 491 2 826 591 13 540 
Bulgaria 9 855 3 385 1 525 1 849 1 375 1 450 19 439 
Romania 13 909 4 844 2 940 2 522 2 748 3 617 30 580 
Czech Republic 6 451 2 927 6 141 2 318 7 984 4 990 30 811 
Hungary 6 325 1 995 2 202 6 290 13 983 3 091 33 886 
Ukraine 10 913 4 816 6 495 7 207 7 833 3 771 41 035 
Austria 6 858 9 303 840 10 618 3 939 11 083 42 641 
Poland 14 839 12 932 13 876 20 616 6 059 - 6 038 62 284 
Switzerland 15 212 28 891 35 145 26 590 10 238 - 5 252 110 824 
Germany 8 109 23 789 65 620 59 317 13 203 26 721 196 759 
                                       Source: Data from UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report        
                                       2014), own computation. 
- FDI net inflows are the value of inward direct investment made by non-resident investors in the reporting economy. (Source: 
The World Bank) 
- Negative FDI net inflow means that divestment is greater than investment. 
We can observe from data found in Table 1 that there isn`t any discernable pattern in FDI inflow, nor by 
date or country (the inflow of FDI doesn`t increase or decrease by year for every country). 
From the “Total “column, years 2008-2013, of the Table 1 we can observe that there are some countries 
with high values of FDI inflow, like: Germany (196 759 million dollars) – ranked first, Switzerland (110 824 
million dollars) – ranked second, Poland (62 284 million dollars) - third, Austria (42 641 million dollars), 
Ukraine (41 035) and some countries with low or extremely low values of FDI inflow: Bulgaria (19 439 million 
dollars), Slovakia (13 540 million dollars), Croatia (13 227 million dollars), Serbia (10 351 million dollars), 
Slovenia (1 908 million dollars) and Moldova (1 821 million dollars). The other countries presented in the 
Table 1 have a medium value of FDI inflow (Hungary, Czech Republic and Romania – ranked in this order). 
We find some unexpected high FDI inflow values for countries like Poland that gets ahead Austria and 
unexpected high FDI inflow values for Ukraine, a non – UE country, part of Transition Economies like Croatia, 
Serbia and Moldova, for the time period 2008-2013. Usually being part of European Union is a political and 
economic advantage for countries, especially when they benefit from central geographical positioning in 
Europe and have an attractive quality of life (the case of Austria), being ranked better than Poland (see Table 3 
for Country Risk Assessment). 
So, maybe there are other reasons for which countries seem more “attractive” in the eyes of foreign 
investors, more complex ones, that being the reason why the connections between FDI inflow, the Corruption  
Index and the Country Risk Assessment should be analyzed, at least according to Rose Ackerman (1999), Della 
Porta and Vannucci (1999), Gani (2007), or Wei (1997).  
From Table 2 we can observe that the leading less corrupt countries are: Switzerland with a score of 87 out 
of 100 (or 8.7 out of 10), followed by Germany (score 79 or 7.9), then Austria (score 75 or 7.5) and Slovenia 
(score 62 or 6.2), for the time period 2008 – 2013.  
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Table 2. Corruption Perception Index, 2008 - 2013, Central Eastern Europe  
 2008-2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
Rank Country Score Rank Country Score Rank Country Score Rank Country Score Rank Country Score 
71 Romania 3.8 69 Romania 3.7 75 Romania 3.6 66 Romania 44 69 Romania 43 
72 Bulgaria 3.7 73 Bulgaria 3.6 86 Bulgaria 3.3 75 Bulgaria 41 77 Bulgaria 41 
14 Austria 8 15 Austria 7.9 16 Austria 7.8 25 Austria 69 26 Austria 69 
14 Germany 8 15 Germany 7.9 14 Germany 8 13 Germany 79 12 Germany 78 
47 Hungary 5.1 50 Hungary 4.7 54 Hungary 4.6 46 Hungary 55 47 Hungary 54 
54 Poland 4.8 41 Poland 5.3 41 Poland 5.5 41 Poland 58 38 Poland 60 
49 Czech 
Republic 
5 53 Czech 
Republic 
4.6 57 Czech 
Republic 
4.4 54 Czech 
Republic 
49 57 Czech 
Republic 
48 
99 Moldova 3.1 105 Moldova 2.9 112 Moldova 2.9 94 Moldova 36 102 Moldova 35 
64 Croatia 4.2 62 Croatia 4.1 66 Croatia 4 62 Croatia 46 57 Croatia 48 
84 Serbia 3.4 78 Serbia 3.5 86 Serbia 3.3 80 Serbia 39 72 Serbia 42 
27 Slovenia 6.7 27 Slovenia 6.4 35 Slovenia 5.9 37 Slovenia 61 43 Slovenia 57 
54 Slovakia 4.8 59 Slovakia 4.3 66 Slovakia 4 62 Slovakia 46 61 Slovakia 47 
140 Ukraine 2.3 134 Ukraine 2.4 152 Ukraine 2.3 144 Ukraine 26 144 Ukraine 25 
 5 Switzerland 9  8 Switzerland 8.7  8 Switzerland 8.8  6 Switzerland 86  7 Switzerland 85 
Source: Own computation based on data from Transparency International 
The Ranking in Table 2 is based upon studies about corruption in 180 countries between years 2008-2009, 178 countries surveyed in 2010, 
183 countries surveyed - years 2011, 177 countries included in the Corruption Index for years 2012-2013 
Score presented on a scale from 0 to 10, Meanings: 0 = Highly Corrupt; 10 = Very Clean, years 2008-2011 
Score presented on a scale from 0 to 100. Meanings: 0 = Highly Corrupt; 100 = Very Clean, years 2012-2013 
 
With just above medium score is Poland with approx. 55 points out of 100, then Hungary, approx. 51 out of 
100, meaning medium corruption perception index, for the time period 2008 – 2013. The other countries score 
as follows for the same time period, 2008 - 2013: Czech Republic (score 47 or 4.7), Slovakia (score 45 or 4.5), 
Croatia (score 43 or 4.3), Romania (approx. score 40 or 4.0), Bulgaria (score 38 or 3.8), Serbia (score 37 or 
3.7), Moldova (score 32 or 3.2) and the lowest score and most corrupt country, Ukraine (24 or 2.4). During the 
time period 2008 – 2013 there are no big changes in the score given to countries for corruption level within 
their economies and institutions. 
 
Table 3. Country Risk Assessments, 2011 – 2014, Central Eastern Europe 
 
A1=VERY LOW RISK; A2=LOW RISK; A3=QUITE 
ACCEPTABLE RISK; A4=ACCEPTABLE RISK; 
B=SIGNIFICANT RISK;  
C= HIGH RISK; D=VERY HIGH RISK 
 
Table 3 shows the same trend, Switzerland being assessed 
as a country with very low economic, political, social, 
institutional and business climate risk, followed by 
Germany, then Austria. Little has changed in the time period 
2011 – 2014 for these countries regarding country risk and 
business climate risk. There is quite acceptable country risk 
and low business risk in Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Czech Republic with a little change for the last two ones` 
here, between the years 2013-2014, from countries with 
quite acceptable risk into countries with acceptable risk. The 
countries with highest degree of country and business 
climate risk are: Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia. 
Source: COFACE, own computation  
 
3. Findings based on gathered data 
 
When comparing Table 1 with Table 2 in the case of Romania, within the time period 2008 – 2011, in 
search of a connection between Corruption Perception Index and FDI inflow, we see that Romania is being 
Country/Region 
Assessment Year  
2011 -2012 
Country Risk/ Business 
Climate 
Assessment Year  
2013 - 2014 
Country Risk/ Business 
Climate 
Romania B/A4 B/A4 
Bulgaria B/A4 B/A4 
Austria A2/ A2 A1/A1 
Germany A2/A1 A1/ A1 
Hungary B/A2 B/A2 
Poland A3/A2 A3/A2 
Czech Republic A3/ A2 A4/ A2 
Moldova D/C D/C 
Croatia B/A4 B/A3 
Serbia C/C C/C 
Slovenia A3/A2 A4/A2 
Slovakia A3/A3 A3/ A2 
Ukraine D/C D/D 
Switzerland A1/A1 A1/A1 
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perceived as a medium corrupt country (scores changing very little from 2008 to 2011) but with impact on FDI 
inflows. As the country is perceived more corrupt and the Corruption index gets lower, FDI inflows decrease 
from 2008 to 2011. In 2012 Romania gets a better corruption score and in accordance with it FDI inflows grow 
in amount.  There is a little discrepancy in 2013 when although the country gets a corruption score lower than 
the year before, 2012, the amount of FDI inflows increases. We may assume that the difference in corruption 
score from 44 in 2012 with a FDI inflow of 2 748 million dollars, to 43 corruption score in 2013, with a 3 617 
million dollars FDI inflow, wasn`t an “alarm trigger” for foreign investors, Romania being a country with 
medium level of corruption.  
Bulgaria doesn`t follow the trend of Romania, in 2011 registering the lowest corruption score for the 
country (3.3 corruption score), the amount of FDI inflows for 2011 surpassing the 2012 and 2013 amounts of 
FDI inflows, years when Bulgaria was perceived less corrupt than the year before (in 2011 - 1 849 million 
dollars FDI inflows, 2012 - 1 375 million dollars and 2013 - 1 450 million dollars FDI inflows). In case of 
Bulgaria, there isn’t a connection between Corruption Perception Index and the amount of FDI inflows 
received by the country from 2008 to 2013. 
Although better scored and perceived as almost “very clean” countries (Switzerland, Germany, Austria) 
gather a better total of FDI inflows from 2008 to 2013, there isn`t a real connection between corruption index 
and FDI inflows year by year when the actual score of corruption modifies to better or worse for the countries 
in discussion. 
Also Poland (a medium level corrupt country) and Ukraine (a highly corrupted country) gather bigger 
amounts of FDI inflows from 2008 to 2013 than Austria (clean form the corruption point of view), or Slovenia. 
Therefore, analyzing tables 1 and 2 we can conclude that there is no correlation or strong connection 
between a countries` perceived corruption and investment inflows to that country, these facts sustaining the 
opinion of some researchers about the influence and impact of only corruption on the volume of FDI flows in a 
country. 
Comparing Table 1 with Table 3 in hopes of finding connections between Country Risk Assessments and 
FDI inflows between years 2011 – 2013, we find that Romania and Bulgaria have a similar country risk 
assessment/ business climate – B/A4, meanwhile, their FDI inflows are different – 30 580 million dollars 
Romania and 19 439 Bulgaria. 
Moreover, Ukraine has a low CRA/ business climate – D/C for 2011/2012 and D/D for 2013/2014 but has a 
high FDI total: 41 035 million dollars. Even if we take into consideration not the total FDI but the investments 
flows for the years 2011-2014 we cannot discern a pattern for this country that will imply a correlation between 
FDI and CRA. 
Further analyzing table 3 we can divide the countries in three broad categories: I. Countries with very 
little/little perceived CRA (Austria, Poland, Germany, The Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia); II. 
Countries with acceptable/significant risk (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia) and III. Countries with 
high/very high risk (Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine). If we take a look at table 1, the FDI inflows, we will see that 
there is no unity among countries from the same CRA category from FDI’s perspective. More than that, not 
even if we factor in a different denominator (the size of the country, which is an indicator –however inaccurate 
– of that economic system’s absorption power) there is not a clear relation between the amount of money 
entering a country and its perceived risk index. 
If we attempt a longitudinal analysis we can again divide the countries from CEE in three categories: I. 
Countries that registered an improvement in their CRA, however slightly): Austria, Germany, Croatia and 
Slovakia; II. Stationary countries – they kept their CRA over the years: Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, 
Moldova, Serbia and Switzerland and III. Countries that registered a worsening of their CRA: The Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. However, when we look at the evolution of FDI inflow for these countries 
(table 1), there is no constant increase for the countries in category I, no stability for countries in category II 
and no constant decrease in FDI for the countries in category III. 
632   Raluca Elena Iloie /  Procedia Economics and Finance  32 ( 2015 )  626 – 633 
Therefore, we can confidently say that, based on the data at our disposal, there is no discernable relation 
between FDI flow and CRA for the countries in CEE. 
4. Conclusions  
There are, as stated in the theoretical framework presented at the beginning of this paper, two types of 
theories regarding the connections between our three main concepts (FDI, Corruption Index and CRA): those 
that postulate that there are important co-variations between the afore-mentioned variables (this category is 
subdivided further into theories that suggest that CRA and Corruption index have an adverse effect upon the 
capacity of a countries’ economic system to attract money from abroad and those who state that the effect can 
be somewhat positive, in the sense that in extremely corrupt systems  “greasing the wheels” can speed things 
up and be the only way of doing business) and those that are of the opinion that there are no significant 
correlations between FDI, CRA and the Corruption Index. 
Within this context, our analysis of our data seems to suggest (even strongly support) the latter. We were 
unable to identify any discernable pattern that links the three concepts together. At this point in our paper we 
must clarify a couple of things. 
First, even if our data does not prove/support the existence of significant relations between FDI, CRA and 
the Corruption Index it does not prove the theories postulating such a connection wrong. In other words, what 
this study argues is that there are no correlations between these theoretical concepts within the analyzed data, 
with no attempts to generalize this conclusion to other information package. 
Second, the data we analyzed is quite specific. It refers at a period of time that includes the onset of the 
current economic crisis, a factor that surely afflicted the FDI flows. More than that, it refers to countries that, 
for the majority of them, are either members of the same economic entity (EU) or are applying for membership. 
It is stating the evidence that the economic and financial flows among these countries is rather particular and 
influenced not only by the characteristics looked at when constructing indicators such as CRA or Corruption 
Index but by broader policies – EU policies. Even the relatively singular position of Ukraine (it has a high FDI 
influx but also bad scores for CRA and the Corruption Index) can be – partially- explained by its proximity to 
EU. Moreover, all these countries are part of a quasi-similar cultural system, in the sense that they are all 
European countries, not like the cultural difference that exists between, let us say, US investors and African 
host-countries. Third, we compared and analyze aggregated indicators, our intention being the creation of a 
factual-based platform for the discussion of the two types of theory mentioned above within the CEE context. 
In other words, if we were to correlate the individual characteristics that make up these complex notions the 
overall picture could be slightly different (for instance, in the case of Ukraine, one explanation of its high FDI 
inflow could be the influx into the country of Russian-based capital). Moreover, there are factors that influence 
the financial matrix between these countries that are historical, or have their origins in political rather than 
economic reasons. In conclusion, we can confidently say that there are no clear connections between FDI on 
one hand and CRA and the Corruption Index on another for the countries in CEE for the period of time 
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